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ECONOMICSOF UPLAND RESOURCE DEPLETION:
SHIFTING CULTIVATION IN THE PHILIPPINESI'/
by
Morion S.delos Angeles2"J
I. INTRODUCTION
The two principal causes of deforestation in less
developed countries today are land clearing _or agriculture
and wood gathering for fuel (Eckholm 1976). However, the
prac%ice o_ sn1£tlng cultlvation" has largely dominated
Based mostly on Chapter III of "Economic Analysis o£
Res0urcelConservation by Upland Farmers in the Philippines,"
Ph.D (Economics) Thesis, University of the Philippines,
1986. "
-2_:
Researchl Fellow, Philippine Institute for Development
Studies.
2clearing of forested land for agricultural production . It
is an agricultural system generally conduc£ed "by a rotation
of fields rather than • crops, by short periods•of Cropping,
alternating with long fallow periods, and by clearing by
•means of slash and burn" (Pelzer, 1968).
In the Philippines, such practice of the "kaingin"
system, as it is termed locally, has usually succeeded
logging activities. While debate on the relative •damage
i
inflicted by upland agriculturists and loggers on the
forests still remains unresolved, it is Perhaps more
important to note that occupancy in the eountry's_ uplands
reached fourteen million (14.0 M) individuals in 1980
(M.C.Cruz, et al, 1986). The effects of land'use systems
by such population, which represents Some 30 percent of the
national total, therefore, cannot be understated.
_e attempt to provide a systematic investigation of
agricultural systems practiced in the uplands by starting
with a formal treatment of the shifting cultivation
problem. We investigate the optimum rate of use of
forested land from society's viewpoint and from the
•"Shifting cultivation", shifting field agriculture",
"swidden farming•", "slash-and-burn farming" and "kaingin"
are terms which• have been used by va_iQus •.authors to ....
indicate, generally, similar agricultura% system.s and .are
used interchangeably in this• paper.
The economics of adoption of soil conserving
technologies by upland communities who are participants of•
development projects shall be presented in a subsequent
workinglpaper.
3individual uplander's viewpoint, given traditional choices
between timber production or agricultural production through
slash and burn farming. Here, swidden farming is
expiained . in termS of a standard resource economic model
on open access exploitation, the discounting bias, and zero
valuation of the externalities involved, as "_ well as
constraints which are specific to upland resource use.
Sections land 2 discuss the varying degree ot
completeness of markets for the products/effects of upland
resource use. Specifically, dissimilar valuation of the
external, environmental, and future effects resulting from
agricultural use of forest land is the major determinant of
rates _ of use of Upland Soil resources. In addition, the
resulting timepaths of resource stocks, scarcity rent,
agricultural production and prices are discussed under
varying decision rules followed by the different resource-
users.
section 3_ubsequently hypothesizes the likely
, [
behavior of forest land use under specific Philippine
conditions of accessibilityand tenure, and presents some
insights on shifting cultivation in varlous parts of the
country. This is followed by a discussion of the implied
policy tools in Section 4.
4rX; A NORMATIVE MODEL•OF OPTIMUM USE OF .FOREST _,AI_P_, •
-FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION : RESOUR<;E,OPTIMIZATION'
UNDER COMPLETE MARKETS
Consider the following relationshiips depicting •
agricultural production on forest land which adopts the
basic natural resource exploitation model, as presented by
Howe ,(i979, Ch. 5):
(i) Q(t) = "" [ L(,t) . S(t) , t]
where Q(t) = agricultural, crops pla_ted in"forest
land;
L(t) = composite labor-capital input;
S(t) = stock of forested land •and soil
resources therein; and
t = time.
Howe includes S(t)i as an argument'to the production
function for a natural resource commodity to reflect what he
calls "stock effegts" (ibid, p'91), and which he defines as:
"(a) an increase of extraction costs _( for the derived
co_odity ) as (resource) depletion proceeds; and (b) a
reduction in future use due to a finite limit to the total
i
quantity of the in situ resource', (ibid, p.72; italics
inserted). An example of such stock effects include higher
effective logging costs for cutting smaller sized trees.
i
We differ in our treatment of S(t) as _ We adapt the
model for the use of upland resources which include both
forests andsoil resources. Under theshifting agriculture
ksystem, the flow of services •from forested uplahds•proceeds
as _ollows. • Immediately•af•ter standing forests are felled •,
the resulting cleared area, which still contains fores£
litter, provides enough -fertility for _ agricultural
production. ••When •the clearing is also accompanied •. by
burning of trees, the.soil resources are enhanced by the
burnt biomass; that is, the addition of slightly burned
vegetation results in an increase•of the organic •matter and-
nitrogen content after burning (Sanchez, 1976), Thus, an •
...
immediate • (i.e., current) •positive stock effect results or
(_Q/_S(t)) > 0; uplands which are forested are therefore
better .sites for agricultural, production, compared for
•example; with non-forested• uplands (e.g•_-, •grassland, pasture
land) of the same slope.
Unless soilconservation measures ire taken, howeve r ,
continued agriculturai pr0d_ction may not be feasible due
tO soil structure deterioratioh., and, to erosion of the
topsoil which is no 10ngerprotected from rainfall (usually
heavy in the tropics)by forest l_tter, Thus, it becomes
more diffi_ul£ to "extract" " agricultural products from
forest land because the nutrient.s earlier provided by the
burnt stock of forest vegetation are no longer avaiiabie,, or
• • -•v• , .
'• . •• • •
are less, for the subsequent cropping cycle. Inthis
z .
manner, the negative stock _ffects hold. These effects are
described by Howe as a cost experienced in the future due to
current use of a given resource stock.
62 2
We expect (_O/_L(t)) > 0, and (2 Q/_L (t)) < 0 from
i
the usual behavior of production • (law of diminishing
returns) •.
Equation• (2) is an inverse demand function_ for
agricultural crops/c0mmodities , given p(t_ as the composite
price of such products:
(2) p(t) = D [ Q(t) , t]
The next relationship •shows•• sooial . benefits, which
•include the use of agricultural products,: as well as the
value of environmental services of untilled forest land,
s(t):
Q(t)
(3) SB(t) = _ D[q(t), t] d n + E_S(t)]
Here, we integrate over Q(t) to indicate that we are valuing
the area under the demand cur.ve, •and•estimating consumers'
surplus.
The environmental services E[S(t)] which are provided
by a stock of forests may•pertain to the minimization of
soil erosion as well•as others such as windbreaks,
ecological diversity, and the provision of oxygen. The
present study focuses largely on soil erosion as the primary
concern among the off-site forest servicesl. Larger stocks
_f forest lands lead to more environmentali services, thus
(dE/dS) > 0.
7Subsequently, we now •investigate the production of
agricultural crops on forest landswhich involves direct
costs such as the opportunity cost of labor-capital,• and the
_bss of environmental • services due to a•reduced forest land
area•. Indirect costs include those imposed on the future,
in particular,• the foregone harvest from secondary forests,
and increasing difficulty of• raising agricultural crops due
to decreasing soil fertility.
Setting _ as the social • discount rate and _ as
the unit opportunity cost of the • labor-capital input, the
optimization • problem for agricultural •production on forest
land becomes:
Q(t) -rt
(4) Max. _[ I D( n,t)d_ + E [S(t)] - wL(t)] e dt
L(t) 0
t •
subject to : (4.1) S(t) = •S(0) - a { Q(T) dT,
(4.2) S(t) > 0.
Equation (4), • (4.1)•• and• (4.2) describes an optimal
control problem where L(t) is the decision variable and
s(t) the state variable. ••Equation (4) says that we are
maxlmizing net social benefits, _ or subtracting current
•production cost, wL(t), from equation (3) over a perpetual
time iperiod, Thus, •under complete • markets, the agricultural
product, environmental services and future effects of using
8part of forested uplands for crop pro_iuction" are all
Considered.• Presumably, •this occurs when t_e decisions made
are based on societal concerns.
Equation (•4.1) is an accounting equation for the • stock
of forested land; the constant a (>0) reiflects the effect
of upland agricultural production on the reduction of forest
land, while S(O) denotes• the initial stock•bf forested land.
Equation (4.2)• is the non-negative conditioh of S(t). The
rate of change of S(t) ,• is therefore:
•e
(5) s(t) : -a . Q(t)
For purposes of manageability, we •inc°rp°rate the
constraint • equation (5) into• (4) and mulitiply the whole
rt rlt
equation by _e dt or equiva_entiy, e _ , to form the
: i
current value Hamiltonian function which' depicts the rake
of net social benefits at instant %:•
Q(t)
(6) H = _ D(_, t) dq + E [S(tl)]
- wL(t) - a . u!(t) Q(t)
.• •
Here, u(t) is the current value Lagrange multiplier, which
is • equal to l.e , corresponding to constraint (5). •The
first two• terms of (6)show the direct add environmental
benefit rates; the third term pertains tol the opportunity
cost of labor-capital • inputs, while the last••term represents
sacrifices imposed on future periods.
9Differentiating H with respect to L(t) gives us:
7) _H = D [Q(t), t] _(t) + dE[S(t)]
_L(t) . _L(t) dS(t)
. • dS(t) .• _•Q(t) - w
dQ(t) _L(t)
-a. u(t) _O(t)
_L(t)
Obtaining (_H/_L(t)) ' = O, we•derive•the following basic
• •• ••• 5/
Condition on price, cost and ren£:-
/
(8),• p(t) = - dE [S(t)] , dS(t) + w
dS(t) _O]q7 _Q(t)
3L(t)
+ a . u(t)
That ••is, the marginal social value of agricultural
products derived from foreBt land at any time must include
three components. The firs_ term on the right covers the
marginal loss of environmental Services. This is positive.
since dS/dQ <• O. The two other components are the marginal
m
_production cost (the second term), and_ the mlrgina! user
cost (or scarcityrent) on the on-site resources being used
up which are not replenished because•secondary•forests are
wiped •out (third term). The marginal cost Of producing
agricultural • commodities from• forest • land} according to
society•.'s viewpoint, therefore includes environmental,•
_roduction and inter_temporal costs.
5/
-- The •appendix presents the details of the mathe-
matical derivations.
I0
Once the right hand • side of eq. (8) exceeds p(t), it
no longer pays for society toproduce the next unit of
agricultural commodity•on•forest lands. Hence, society is
better off obtaining additional agricultural products from
other _sour_es _such as the lowlands or the international
market.
The movement of scarcity rents on i_n_n_itu •resources now
may be seen from•the following:
(9) Basic condition 2 :
u(t) + [p(t), a. u(t)] 8Q(t) + dE = r. u(tl
_S(t) dS (t)
From equation (8), [p(t) - a u(_)] > 0 ; thus,
given that (_Q/_S) > 0, and (dE/dS) > 0, then (u(t)/u(t))
in equation (9) is positive. Here we can,see that whenthe
optimum size of f0restland is carried forward, three types[
of benefits are enjoyed by society (left-hand side of
f,
(9): (a) increase in its value; (b) reduction of future
• I
production costs of ..agrgc_.ZCura z commodities; and (c) the
value of additional enylronmental services (Howe 1979, p.93;
italics inserted). The sum 9f these ben4fits should yield
i
the socially required rate of return r on the value, of
u(t), the scarcityrent.
Hence, the first basic condition (eq. 8), tells us
the optimal rate of producing agricultural crops on forest
11
land While basic condition 2 (eq. 9) shows the optimai stock
of forest lands.
III. THE PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL'S USE OF UPLAND SOIL RESOURCES"
RESOURCE OPTIMIZATION UNDER INCOMPLETE MARKETS
After having derived societal decision rules, we now
discuss individual decision-making criteria. "We tackle
three cases of private resource users : those with secure
land tenure; those without property rights ; and the
special case of shifting Cultivators.
3.1 The Private Resource-User With Secure Land Tenure
A potential upland cultivator in a perfectly
Competitive setting for agricul£ural products would likely
ignore the off-site environmental services provided by the
stock of in situ resources. The Corresponding formulation
of his objective function, with the omission of E [S(t)],
would result in:
Q(t) -rt
(i0) Maxlmize [ / D (_, t) d_ - wL(t)] e dt
L_t) o
t
subject to: (i0.i) S(t) -a . Q(t)
(i0.2) S(t) > 0
The corresponding basic conditions would be:
(ii) p(t) = w + a . u(t)
Qi't) "
L(t)
12
I%
(12) '_(t) + [_(t) - a. _(t)] Q(t) = .r . .u(t)
" . S(t)
Equation (ii) implies that the "private cost" p(t) of
agricultural crops raised in the uplands would be lower than
the social cost p(t) indicated earlier in eguation (8)
i
because off'site eDvironmental costs are Ignored; that is,
the value of equation (ii) is less than tha6 of eq. (8) _by
the factor [-- (dE(S)/dS) . (dS/dQ)] > 0. Therefore, given
the same demand curve for agricultural products faced by
both types of _ecisi0n-makers, an individual would produce
more agricultural crops, or would convert ailarger , f0rested
upland area for agriculture use, as against the area that
society would consider. As a result, in situ rent given in
equation (12)woul_ rise faster. That is, i golving for u and
u in the two equations for the second basic iconditions, (9)
and (12) respectively, a difference o_ the magnitude
(dE/dS) > 0 implies Q < u. Hence, whenl the market is
incomplete because the off-site environmental effects of
Converting forested uplands to agricultural croplands
through swidden farming are not included in the exchange,
larger areas tend to be deforested and scarhity rent rises
faster.
Furthermore? private decision'making a_so differs from
public choice in terms of the time preference rate: an
individual normally uses a rate higher than what a public
13
planner would apply, or r > r." Solving thus for the r&s,
comparing equations (9) and (12), and bearing in mind that
(dE/dS) > 0, we obtain evena wider gap between u and u.
3.2 The Individual User Without Secure Land Tenure
Reaction to the effects of changing land-use from
timber production to agricultural production may
additionally differ according tovarying property rights.
An/upland cultivator who has exclusive, secure use of soil
resources _or a given upland area would be more responsive
to the on-site, future effects of a decreasing stock of soil
resources th'an one without•pr0perty rights.
When, right s to use public land are not secure, the
stock effects (of decreasing forests) may be excluded, or
U(t) = 0. In this case, the corresponding basic conditions
would be:
(13) p = w
_(t)
8L(t)
(.14) u(t) •= r. u(t), or u(t) =
u(t)
The price thatthe cultivator attaches to his.produc e
tilled, public, (erstwhile) forest land is equivalent only
to his valuation Of the effort that went into agr'icultural
production, as depicted by eq. (13).
That is, assuming the time preference rate is properly
reflected by r, for purposes of. asimpler exposition.
14
Public land is. hence used at a faster rate for-swidden
farming; a "smaller stock of forests ,.results and- .user
cost rises at a faster rate. Thafi is, solving for
u(t)/u(t) .in equations (9), (12) and .(14) would yield
the following relationships: (u/u) > (u/u) > (u/u) > _ 0,
with the differences-being accounted forby exclusion of
the terms [_Q(t)/_S(t).] > 0, [dE[S(t) /dS(t)] > '0, and
a.u(t) > 0.
Indeed, with the absence of property rights for tilling
1
"I " '
the Uplands, the upland resources whichinclude the forests
are even depleted at a faster rate because the stock effects
[
are excluded indecision-making. Moreover, insecurity of
tenure leads _to an even higher discount rate. Thus,
comparing equations (14) and (12), and _ > r, the faster
marginal user cost rises because land _s depleted at .a
faster rate.-- Figure .i .shows the results Of decisions
arrived at byvarious users of forest land• Theforest area
1
used for agricultural production by socilety (aQ) is less
- A •
than that determined by private individuals (aQ and aQ), and
by the individual withoutproperty rights who. uses- the
largest area (i.e., aQ <aQ < aQ).
In the special case of_the Shifting cultivator-, which
we shall discuss more fully in section 2._ below, the area
aQ. is furthermore cultivated frequently by Several users,
thereby resulting in faster depletio n of soil _es0urces.
!/ Scarcity_rent being equal to zeroS" in fact, implies
U/U .'= _ •
is
p(t ) _
.MC(t) = (dE[S] 'dS)(dS(t)/dQ(t)) +-
w(aQ/_L):+ .a.u(t)
-_C(t). = w(aQ/aL)+ a a
p(t ) %
i_( t ) \ "_ t) = w(_0/as)..
• i
: [_(t)
• I
I I
[ I
•l I . i. .
I .I I.
I I I
L D(t )
- | ""
t • I I
• I • I I.
! I I •
-_ _(t)ap, <_ _a_4 ,- -.
FIGURE. I : ..DETERMINATIONOF AREAFOR ,.AGRICULTURALPRODUCTION
.BYVARIOUS DECISION 'MAKERS
L E G.E.N D :
Decision-maker Marginal Cost Area for Agricultural
production
society MC aO
individual .with property rights _ a_
individual,w/o property rights MC a_
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3.3 Behavior of _•, •2, R and •_ over time
Given.• these, we may now proceed to determine the time
•paths of forest (and soil) resource stock, agricultural
production in the uplands, price of agricultural•commodities
and scarcity rent for the three cases discussed above. We
focus on resource supply factors_ therefore abstracting•from
changes in demand for hot5 agricultural products, forest
products• and amenities. We assume th@t for varying•
resource,based products and services, relative prices will
hold.
We compare forest soil resource use by society, where
the market is complete, with resource use by an individual
decision maker •who disregards the off-site amenities from
resource stock, butwho internalizes stock effectsbecause
property _rights exist. We obtain from equations (8)• and
(ii) the • relationship, p(t) > p(t), since [-dE[S(t)]/dS(t))
(dS(t)/dQ(t))] > 0. Thus, •the private sector resource
user would attribute a lower •agricultural commod{ty price
p(t), produce at a higher level Q , and the resource stock
would initially decrease at a faster rate.
Further, since the social discount ra_e is• lower than
F i
< r > _• the initialthe individual's discount rate, or
[p(t) - a u(t)] of•the private• user is leiss than that for
{ ° 1
society; and , he als0 excludes (dE/dS). H_n_e, the terms
u(t) > u(t) in equations (9) and (12). • •scarcity rent
17
thus increases faster for the individual who uses. the
resource stock, more rapidly.
-.After a longer time ..has .elapsed, however, lower
resource stockswould result, in higher incremental costs
. , , .
in extracting the resource'based - product. In addition,
1
rents rise at ,faster rates, or u > u. Eventually,
p(t) > p(t) when Q(.t)<Q(t) (Figure 2).
In the case of a resource user who has no tenure in the
uplands, or the shifting cultivator, the situation is even
J
worse: the initially higher agricultural production.would
decrease-rapidly to lower levels, and scarcity 'rent would
increase rapidly. This means that during an earlier point
in time,.. Q > Q and .<.p because the resource user
who. has no tenure disregards even. the stock, effects of
production.." Scarcity rent wouldrise ata higher rate, or
u > u. , virtually affecting agricultural commodity
production... Thus., during a latter-point in time..,, p > p
A
when Q < Q ..
3.4 The Shifting Cultivator
For upland..farmers occupying inadequately secured
public forests, the land .may be tilled many timesover by
several- .cultivators in . a similar fashion,".thus crowding
}'.
occurs, in the exploitation of open access fishery resources,
specially under, condit_bns, of"high unemployment, orlack of
alternatives, in the economy (clark. 1973),. and high-man-land
18
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ratios. In addition, under £ropical conditions where a
stringent time constraint for land preparation is imposed by
seasonal patterns, and effeCtive labor availability is low
(e.g., few tools are used and hiring labor is not feasible
because incomes are low or surplus labor arenot available
in tMe uplands during the planting season), the farmer is
induced to adopt a time-saving land preparation technique,
that of slash-and-burn farming, or kaingin-making.
If time is the only variable input I, the relevant
portion of a total product curv6 for a slash-and-burn type
of agriculture is the downward sloping section, _ that is,
when average agricultural productivity declines. Indeed, it
is only the first harvest af£erfelling and burning has
occurred when agricultural production is highest. In figure
3, the curves with Solid lines illustrate the negative
portions of the total product curves for agricultural
production. Fast depletionof top soil resources follows
after the rains come, resulting in lower subsequent yields.
Mostshifting cultivators therefore till the field for 0nly
1-3 years, after which the invasion of weeds makes further
cultivation too laborious, and shifting to another field is
more desirable.
The shifting cultivator Who has tenure avoids stock
effects by either developing better, land-conserving, soil-
use technology, or udjusting his consumption pattern to suit
the availability of produce from the land, and or seek other
20•
•sources of livelihood. The latter choi.ce implies that
during the fallow period • during which the soil is able to
replenish itself, the piece Of land is protected from
•encroachment by other users; this is feasible under a given
system • of property rights. Indeed, _he evolution of
•commonly determined rules on resource eMploitatiQn by • a
community of resource usershas been !documented (e.g.
w. crul, 1982 for the Philippine•f•isheries'! case and Lynch,
1984 for e_amples • of cultural minority groups in the
country's ••up!an_s) •. The practice of shifting to another
r
field is thus a process of avoiding higher marginal user
cost (and allowing on-site soil conservation through the
natural process of regeneration). •
The choice of burning as a technique of preparing the
; declining landupland results in varioUs degrees of
productivity, depending on the reiatiOnship among the
population of upland cultivators, land area availability••and
Ithe rules for governing the•use of land. For areas with low •
man'land ratios, a ,stable" system of shifting a_riculture
may result, where long fallow periods are followed (Figure
3a); the opposite case characterizes areas with high
population density, and eventualshorteningof the fallow
period • (Figure 3b). Similar • such diagrams • have been
presented by Sanchez (1976, p. 384) which we reproduce here
[ {
as Figure 4.
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Agron, Tropica]e (France) ll: 143-176;
reproduced in Sanchez (197.,6),Figure i0.17,
p. 384
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The F-labelled curves refer •to timber production from
the forest which has been the traditional use of forest
lands. The curves labelled 'Q' pertain to agricultural
production. •. They are located below the •F curves to•
signify iower current values of output.
Figure 3a • depicts the •_irst tlme the forest is used
for agricultural production at t when the stand • of
trees shall have been harvested. Production of•crops,
signified by Q is •thus C0nducted at the expense of future
timber, and is indicated by the segment Of curve F that
, 4
is covered du_ing the time interval (t , t ).
1 4
The dashed portion of curve Q shows production of
2
biomass by the untilled fallowed land which is used for
cultivation again in year t . Figure 3a there£ore shows a
2
shifting of fields patterned in such a way that a given
piece of forest land is used '•only at intervals which are
equal and gives the same yield, other things remaining
equal. A variagt •of this diagram which depicts a
lengthening of fallow periods and increasing yields is not
shown here.
The same piece of land when subjected to shifting
agriculture, which occurs at shorter time intervals, shall
result in productivity declines in the long-run. This is
The •determination of t •is the subject of another
area of study/ and is treated as a •given here. The reader
may see Samuelson (1976) for this.
24
depicted•in • Figure •3.1b where the fallo_ periods decrease,
(t ' < t , t ' . < t ,. t. ' < t ) , ! and agricultural
•2 2 3 3 " .4 '4
production dedlines. (Q ' <.Q. , Q ' < Q ' and Q '.< Q )..
2 2 3 3 4 " 4
This figure shows both user c0st.a:nd, on-site Stock
effects of depletion .but it -does • not. present the
off-site enviEonmental. •effects of slash-_nd-burn farming_
[
Thus, only the concerns of:the individuail decision makers
• ,.,,,
(timber manager and theshifting cultivator) are •presented.
IV. .SOME INS!GHTS FROM THE PHILIP, PINE I_XIPERIENCE
We now .presen t some data whichsupport, the vargous
points we raised • in the preceding discussion by-.citing
• , • j
evidence gathered by several researchers oh kaingin-maki.ng.
We. focus firit on "stable" systems whichi are usually, but
not always, evolved by members Of Cultural minorities.
Table i, which presents data on labor,use, was gathered
by Conklin (.19.57) on swidden.farming by the "Hanunuo in
:Mi.ndoro, and. has a .cycle of at least eleven years. We note
that• felling of climax•forests (stages:2 and 3), relative"to
other activities, ..such as interplanting, • protection,
I
weeding, and"harvesting,.are more labor-u6!ng,. This is true
for.. the .agricultural use of•secondary forests (woody or
bamboo•type•),, except for the felling activity which is more
intensive for the •thick climax .(old-@rowth) forests.
Burning hastens theconversion • of biomass from the felled
trees, compared to the alternative • ofdecay, which could take
severalyears.
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TABLE I
LABOR-USE IN HANUO0 SWIDDEN FARMIN_
Ma_,.--day s
of New Swid_e_ i_ Secor, d Growth
=
C lima x
Sta_es Act ivity " Forest " Woo c_y Bainboo
i Site Selecting .8 .4 4
• 2 SlashirmD .8 12.5: 18.8
•3 Fel i ir,g 43. 8 18. _ 5.0
4 Fire •breaking i..2 5. • 5.0
Burriirlg .5 .2 .. .2
Rebu_r_i'rJ_o .21.9 _2. 5; 6.2-
5 Piar,tino Maize 1.2 1.2 1.2
Plargting Rice 18.8 16._ . lb.2
lr,terol ant inq. 37.5 37.5 3 t.5
Repiar_t iTi'._ 6 .6 : .3
Fencing 18.8 18.8 18_ 8.
Protect i_g 18.8 9.4 9.4
Guardir, c! 50.0 _5.0 25.0
First Weedir_o 1_.5 18.8 18.8
Secorld Weedino_ " . 25". 0 25.0
ThirJr_irw_0& Last Wee diri0 ;_5.0 31.2 3!.2
•6 Harvestir__q Maize -'i0.0 10.0 10.0
•H-arvestirt_ Rice 37.5 37'5 37.5
Storir, o' Rice 3.8 3.8 3.8
Cleahirtg 25.0 25.0 25.0
--8 Norr--ora in -Cuit ivat ior,
arwd Harvestir_g ' 62.5 b2.5 6_.5
• . , . -.
Total 397.5 371.9 , 358. I
, , , (
N.B. : Cor,klir,'s original figures whic_ were exoresseo :tr, mar,-
hours we_'e cor_verted to rnar,-days.-usirig a facto_ of..8., r_ari-hours
pe_?..mar_-clay.. ..
SOURCE: Cor,klir, (1957).
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The highly seasonal • pattern of producing crops from the
rainfed uplands is depicted by Figure 5, for the Batac of
•Palawan •Island. Various supplementary activities with
differing abilities•to produce food are undertaken by this
group, some of the non-farm sources of•livelihood include
collection of forest products, fishing, andlpa_ticipation in
the labor market.
Indeed, the capacity of other uplands with similar
•geoclimatic conditions to support people depends on the
agricultural system being used. Table 2 presents an at_:empt
by Rice (1981) to evaluate three systems in terms of
maximum allowable population density. ••The first system,
labelled "s ingle-crop-i•a trusive" refers • to predominantly
pasture use of the upland, resulting in an• agricultural •
cycle that is quite lengthy. As a system that is assumed to
be the major source of l•iveli•hood (as far as Rice's
computations are concerned), it has a very !ow potential for
supporting large numbers Of people. •Rice notes that this
system is normally practiced •by lowlanders living •in
clusters (1981, p. 80).
The second • pattern depicted in Table 2 • is •that O f
shifting cultivation where a single crop is planted.
According to Rice •, the• Ikalahans of Nueva Vizcaya typically
practice such a system. The agricultural cycle is eighteen
(18) years, a small fraction compared to the previous
system's seventy-five (75) years. The third system, which
27
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TABLE 2
EXAMPLES OF UPLAND AGRICULTURAL'SYSTEMS EVALUATED IN TERMS
OF ALLOWABLE POPULATqON DENSI?Y
_ca.di t i9r,a_ No r,-T_md i_tior,a i Systems:
Single Crop Single C_c',p Ir,diqer, ous
Intrusive Ind i_er,o_s Ir,ter-Croppin9
• " . . ,, " . • , .
a Usual period ofm ,,
cultivation 5 years 4 year:_ 5 years
,L
b. Subsequent pasture _
use 40 •yea_?_ - -
i
c. Required faliow
.per:_orJ "Sr_ years 14 yea_s 1 I yea_s
d _ Total agricultu_a% . " _"
•cycle ( a+b+c) 75 Yea_s 18 yea_s 16 years
e. Utilizatior, rate
(a/d) .. 7% . 2.2.% 31%
f. •Cultivated larfd
r,eecled pe_ _ami ly
as observed 1.4 h_. _1.0 h_. 0.7 ha.
'J i
_. A_i.cult ural la_,d
" neeclecl per _?arhi ly
: (c/e) 20 ha. 4.5 ha_. 2. 3 ha.
h. Agricult ural ar,d
• watershed lan_ •
riemclecl per family 420,:ha_ _9.5 ha. ,25. 3 ha,
i. Maximum al iowem
populatic, r, der,s_ty . -,
per 1000 -,bern'tares a. 4 fmrnD 20_ _-_ "_arn. 3"9. 5] Tam,
SOUrCe: Rice (198[L')_ 'TaDle 2, p. 80.
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•is swidden farming with multiple crops,• yields more and is
•therefore •able tosuppor t a iarger group of people. This
system"is.usua!lyobservedof, the .Tiboli of Mindanao and the
Kalingas of./Northern Luzon.
An important .aspect.. presented by-Rice which .:is. not
W. " '
usually .tackled by other researchers, .at. least in empirical
terms, .is..tl_e watershedarea.implied by the. three, upland
systems (item. h of. Table 2). ' " This implies .a recognition
of the environmental service provided byforests in the
uplands.
Table.. 3 presents data."on upland rice productivity
for a grQup. of erstwhile !owlanders now cultivating a
: • • • [ [
porti0n-of a major watershedin Luzon. It shows decreasing
yields... Over time for a watershed whose conditi0n has. been
characterized as .critical.from theenvironmental point of
View,. and .-implies .urgency for solving the " upland
degradation and .cultivation..Problems .where" non-culturall
minoritiesare concerned.
V. IMPLIED POLICY TOOLS
•To derive the various pol•icy tools available to the
public .decision maker, we rewrite the set of first basic
conditi0n.s.for opti_izationl.by society; the private user who
has property .rights; and..the ,squa£ter" on forest lands
respectively, as follows:
30
TABLE 3
AVERAGE LAND PRODUCTIVITY IN A TRADITIONAL KAINGIN
FARM IN PUTING LUPA_ MT. MAKILING,i 1978-1980
"_=¢ _" "_" _ _ _'_"_'_- _-- _---_ :_ _ :_:_. _,_-_-_- _- _== _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- _=¢_ w_.D_._._-',, =s _ -,i. _ .-,:._• _.,_ _ _ _. _==
Year Producti_,r,. Per Hectare
(ca_an)
197e 26.74
1979 13.89
19_o _.68
_---__--.-_---_-__=,___ _:______ ___
Source: Corpuz (1984), Table 28, p,88
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(8) p(t) = w/[ Q(t)/ L(t)] + a . u(t)-(dE[S(t)]/dS(t)])
• (dS(t)/dQ(t))•
(11) ^ ( .p t)= W/[ Q(t)/ L(t)] + a u(t)
(13) p(t) = w/[ Q(t)/ L(t)]
We note the assignment of• property •rights, which
restricts access to the uplands by other users, would
encourage the Upland cultivator to consider at least the
(marginal user• cost, or•a . u(t) (i.e., (3.11) versus 3.•!3).
• . .'
Furthermore, a comparison between equations (3.8) and (•3.11)
Shows that •the additional•policytool that would allow such
user to take into account some of the off-site
environmental effects would be to tax him at a rate which
approximates [ - dE[S{t)]/dS(t)] . [dS(t)/dO(t)], or impose
environmental charges. Application of the •policy tools
discussed would result in rotation of the relevant marginal"
cost curves, as indicated in •Figure i.'• These would lead to
an optimal agricultural use of forest land fromthepublic
standpoint.
A problem •may arise, however, with respect to the
feasibility of imposing environmental charges on SUbsistence
farmers whose minimal cash income, if any, would make such
policy tool unimplementable. It may even be argued, that
subsidies may be a more effective incentive for encouraging
soilconservation at •least in the short-run.
9_/
•See Baumol and Oatas (1975) for a discussion of taxes
versus subsidies as environmental policy tools.
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•More •importantly, the end result of a stable shifting
of •fields ••still implies that there are periods during
T
rotations, when- an up.landarea is under.fallow .and cannot
provide subsistence. • For .those who relyion the uplands as a
major source of livelihood, this. implies the need for a
large •area•of• land.to be.worked.out, I/n£h of an area at a
' l
time• for a •rotation period .of n years.
Moreover, .w_thin a given year during whi_ch land 'is cropped,
there • is .an off, farmingseason (dry months) when food •
requirements, need • to .be met, either .through surplus
production (implying.again,- working on a .large tract of
land) •, or through other food sources such as ..hunting,
• ••, ••
.fishing,and the like•. That is,. given a land-use• technology
that has detrimental effects on soil.conservation,.and is.
land-extensive, the potential for supporting .a growing.
population is severely limited. Therefore, there is a case
F
for developing a more •efficient, -land-saving, •less soil-
erosive.type_of.technology for producing non-timber croPs•in
the up•lands.
The dis•cuss•ion t_us. points out the need• for securing
r@ghts to•use up•land resources"for agricultural .use., and
•encouragement • of. alternative technologies which are soil-
Conserving. ".The Case for agro-forestry, Subsidies for soil -•
conserving uplandfarmers, control' of•upland resource use
and..well,defined .rights for•such use'cannot therefore be
overemphasized.
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APPENDIX
•MATHEMATICAL ANNEX
Optimum Agr-icultur,al Useof Forest Lands: Soil
Conserving Technology (Agrof0restry) Unknown
Given the following firstthree •equations for the
agricultural production, function (I), agricultural demand.
function• (2), and social benefits from agricultural products
and environmental services from resource stocks:
(i) O(t) = _ [L(t), s(t),t]
•_Q _Q dQ
where , , > 0
_L (t) _S (t) dt
• _2Q _2Q d2Q
and _L2(t) ' %S_(t) '--d_ < 0
(2) p(t) = D [O(t_, t]
(3) SB(t) = _0 (t) D[_(t), t]d_ + E [S(t)], dE > 0dS
Net benefits from resource use is maximized as follows:
_ IQ (t)O ,(4) Max /0 [ 0 [_(t) t] dD + E [S(t)_- wL(t)] e'rtdt
L(t)
s.t. S(t) S(0) - a • f0 Q(T)dT
S(t) > O
From the first constraint of equation (4), we obtain:
(5) S(t) = ~a•. Q(t)
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Using (4 ) and (5 ) the following current value
Hamilt0nian may be formed:
(6) _ =_N(t)D(_,t) d_ + E IS(t)' wL(t)] - a i U'_'Q _t" _
where u(t) •is• the current value multiplier associated with •
rt
equation (5), •and is equal •to•l e :.
DO(t) dE[S (t)] dS(t) _Q(t)
(7) _ = D[Q(t),tJ + " "
BL (t) _L (t) dS (t) dQ (t) • 8L (t)
_Q (t)
-w-a . u(£) BL(t)
Or, substituting (2) gives-
_ _ dE[S (t)I dS(t) _O(t)
= p(t) . + - • •_L(t) dS(t) dQ(t)
-w - a_. u(t) _Q(t)
_Q (t) we
Setting _ and dividing by _ ) 0
_L(t) 0
obtain :
(8) • ds
aL(t) = _(ti + dE[S(t)]•• (t,)dS(t) dQ(t) - w - a _ t,) S 0
Thus, we have basic condition. 1 as:
(9) p(.t) = - cIE[S tt-_h] dS_ + w
• _(t) "•dO(t) •_' • •. u(t)
aL(t)
The second basic condition may be s_ obtained by
differentiating as follows:
(I0) u(t) -- r . u(t) - _H
._s(t)
[D _Q + dE [S(t)]
= r. u(t)- [O(ti, t] 8S(t) dS(t) 'r
• j_Q-a . u(t) . 8s(t)
Again, •using (2) and rearranging: '
J
_Q
_Q a . u(t) 3S(t)(t) = r ..u(t) - p(t) S(t)
dE[S(t)]I ..+ dS (t).
' - • •_ dE[s (t) ]
= r . u(t) - [p(t) - a . u(t)] 3S(-_ - dS(t)
Thus, the second basic condition is:
• _Q dE[S(t)] r.u(t)
(ii) u(t) + [p(t)- a , u(t)] -_SqE]-.+ dSqt)'
For ' the private decision'maker's case where E[S(t)] is
omitted as an argument in (4) ,. t_he resulting basic
conditions •would • be :
w
(9)' _ (t)=. _Q(t) + a . _(t)
(ii)' 6(t) + .pit) - a _(t)] :9 Q(t)
• _s(t) •
Further, when the S(t) is excluded as a co,stralnt by the
private individual who has not property rig_tl _ have . the
•• • , - •
corresponding b_sic conditions as follc_ws_
• "W
_L (t)
(ii)" _(t) - 9 . _(t)
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